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Abstract— This study investigates the effect of the ownership 
structure on dividend policies for firms listed at the Casablanca 
stock exchange. Two aspects of the ownership structure are used, 
the first is the ownership concentration and the second is the 
identity of the largest shareholders. A panel data analysis is 
performed to examine the relationship between the dividend 
policy and the ownership structure in this emerging market for 
the period between 2004 and 2010. Results show that two forms 
of ownership identity influence negatively the dividend policy of 
firms listed. In fact, when the identity of the largest shareholder 
is either an industrial company or a family, the level of 
distributed dividends is decreased. Furthermore, findings show 
that there is no impact of ownership concentration on dividend 
policies for firms listed at the Casablanca Stock Exchange. 
Keywords-component: Agency Problems, Dividend Policy,  
Emerging Markets, Ownership Strcuture. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Dividend payout decisions have been widely studied in the 
modern financial literature; they are an important component of 
the corporate policy. The dividend policy depends on many 
factors such as the firm’s financial performance and liquidity 
position, its position in its life cycle, taxation and investment 
opportunities among others. Various dividend policy theories 
have emerged [1]. Previous studies have investigated the 
relationship between dividend policy and agency costs. It is 
shown that the dividend policy diminishes the agency costs that 
arise from conflicts between the firm’s shareholders [2]. If the 
firm’s profits are not distributed as dividends, corporate 
managers may use them for their own interest and invest in 
unsuccessful negative NPV projects. Studies about the 
separation of ownership and control show that the more 
concentrated the ownership the lower equity agency costs [3].  
This paper concentrates on agency theories of dividend 
policy in an emerging market with a focus on corporate 
ownership structure and few controlling variables.  It provides 
more insights into the literature by empirically examining the 
relationship between dividend policy and ownership structure 
for firms listed in an emerging market where corporate 
governance mechanics are weak. Findings show that the 
dividend policy of firms listed in the Casablanca stock 
exchange is negatively influenced by two forms of ownership 
identity namely the industrial company and family types of 
identity. Results also show that there is no impact of ownership 
concentration on dividend policies.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 
2 briefly discusses motivation and background for this study, 
while Section 3 summarizes the data used in the analysis. 
Section 4 and Section 5 present assessment of our hypothesis 
and robustness of our results, respectively. The paper ends with 
Section 6 where we present conclusions. 
II. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Plentiful of prior literature documents inadequacies in 
corporate governance mechanisms in emerging markets [4]- 
[6]. This strand of literature considers ineffectiveness of 
regulatory authorities, weak enforcement mechanisms, and 
presence of family control as the main reasons behind 
ineffective governance mechanisms. One of the implications of 
poor governance mechanisms is exacerbation of agency 
problems in firms headquartered in emerging markets. Agency 
problems are supposed to provide means and incentives to 
insiders to expropriate resources out of firms, thereby adversely 
affecting firm performance. Mitton (2002) [7], for example, 
documents poor performance of firms with high agency 
conflicts. An essential requirement for insiders to expropriate is 
the extent of control that they exert over firms. This control is, 
usually, exercised by obtaining controlling stakes in firms. 
Control of firms allows insiders to expropriate by overpaying 
themselves, expensing on overambitious projects, undertaking 
related party transactions, and hiring employees related to 
them. 
Excessive expropriation can lead to reduction in dividend 
payouts. Prior literature argues that low dividend payout can be 
an indication of high agency problems [2], [8]. In this paper, 
we aim to document whether ownership structure of a firm – an 
important mechanism via which expropriation can take place – 
affects dividend policies of firms listed at the Casablanca Stock 
Exchange. For the purpose of this paper, we define ownership 
structure by two variables: (1) Ownership concentration and (2) 
Identity of the largest shareholder. Following sub-sections will 
illustrate how these two variables impact dividend policies in 
more details. 
A. Ownership concentration and dividend policy 
 
Ownership concentration is an internal governance device 
that allows the largest shareholder to gain control over firm’s 
activities and resources. Such a control, usually, introduces 
agency conflict between the largest shareholder and the 
minority shareholders [9]. The agency conflict stems from the 
fact that ownership concentration provides incentives and 
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means to the largest shareholder to expropriate minority 
shareholders [10], [11]. Concentrated ownership allows 
controlling shareholders to conspire with managers to deplete 
minority shareholders’ resources [12]. The expropriation can 
take a variety of forms. In some instances, the insiders simply 
steal the profits. In other instances, the insiders sell the output, 
the assets, or the additional securities in the firm they control to 
another firm they own at below market prices. Such transfer 
pricing, asset stripping, and investor dilution, though often 
legal, have largely the same effect as theft. Furthermore, 
ownership concentration can also provoke operational 
inefficiencies when owners are interested in short-term 
performance rather than long-term profitability [13]. Given the 
fact that ownership concentration exacerbates agency 
problems, we argue that it induces controlling shareholders to 
evade effective disclosure of firm value [14].  
In this paper, we argue that ownership concentration, due to 
its ability to increase agency problems, negatively affects firm 
performance and leads to lower dividend payout ratios. Our 
arguments are consistent with previous literature that 
documents negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and dividend payout ratios. Mancinelli and 
Ozkan (2006) [15], for example, examine the relationship 
between ownership structure and dividend policy for Italian 
firms and document negative relationship between the voting 
rights of the largest shareholder and dividend payouts. In 
another related study, Harada and Nguyen (2011) [16] use a 
large sample of Japanese firms and show that firms with higher 
ownership concentration pay lower dividends. This strand of 
literature argues that ownership concentration affects dividend 
policies due to its ability to define the extent of agency 
problems within firms. Firms with concentrated ownership vest 
more powers in the hands of controlling shareholders, who tend 
not to disclose all information in order to reap private benefits 
of control. This paper, therefore, hypothesizes that private 
benefit of control lead to lower dividend payout ratios. 
H1a: Firms with high ownership concentration have low 
dividends payout ratios 
 
However, plentiful of arguments can be cited to develop a 
case of a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and dividend payout ratios. We argue that 
insiders of firms with concentrated ownership are aware of the 
fact that outsiders associate ownership concentration with high 
agency problems. Therefore, it is in the best interest of these 
firms to do something that can signal low agency conflicts. We 
argue that paying high dividends is one such signal. Grossman 
and Hart (1980) [8] argue that dividend payouts alleviate 
agency conflicts through the reduction of free cash flow 
available to managers. In another related study, Jensen (1986) 
[2] documents that high dividend payouts lessen agency costs 
by reducing free cash flows that could be expensed on 
unprofitable projects. This strand of literature argues that 
paying high dividends reflects managements’ good faith and 
signals low agency problems. Consequently, it is very plausible 
to assume that firms with ownership concentration pay high 
dividends. 
H1b: Firms with high ownership concentration have high 
dividend payout ratios 
B. Identity of the largest shareholder and dividend policy 
 
This paper argues that identity of the largest shareholder 
can also provide value relevant information about dividend 
policies of firms. We believe that every investor has its own 
motive for amassing control and these motives can 
significantly affect dividend policies. For the purpose of this 
paper, we classify the largest shareholders as institutional 
investor, industrial company, government, family, and 
foreigner. Prior literature considers institutions as an important 
channel via which agency problems can be reduced in 
emerging markets [17]. This strand of literature argues that 
institutions have greater resources, are more sophisticated, and 
have more relevant expertise to monitor management. As a 
result, they are able to force effective disclosure of information 
[18]-[22]. We argue that low agency problem in firms with 
institutional investors as the largest shareholder result in high 
dividend payout ratios. Our conjecture is consistent with Eckbo 
and Verma (1994) [23] who show that institutional 
shareholders prefer distribution of dividends in an attempt to 
reduce agency costs. In another related study, Short, Hao and 
Kevin (2002) [24] show that dividend payout ratios and the 
institutional ownership are positively related for the UK firms. 
Consistent with above literature, this paper hypothesizes high 
dividend payout ratios for firms with institutional investors as 
the largest shareholder. 
H2: Firms with institutional investor as the largest 
shareholder have high dividend payout ratios 
Industrial company ownership applies when other firms are 
the largest shareholders of a firm. Prior literature argues that 
this type of ownership arrangement can positively influence 
firm performance. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) [25], for 
example, assert that the corporate/industrial company 
ownership ease the transfer of knowledge. They argue that 
transfer of knowledge enhances the financial performance of a 
firm and facilitate its growth. In another related study, 
Williamson (1985) [26] argues that firms end up acquiring 
shares in others firms in order to monitor managerial 
discretion. As a result of more monitoring, agency problems 
are reduced and firm performance goes up. We argue that 
positive influence of industrial company ownership is, partly, 
due to the fact that high dividends that may result from better 
performance can also improve cash flow of industrial 
company. Therefore, this paper hypothesizes positive impact of 
industrial company ownership on dividend payout ratios. 
H3: Firms with industrial company as the largest 
shareholder have high dividend payout ratios 
In emerging economies, government ownership stems from 
the lack of property rights [27]. Prior literature associates 
plentiful of problems with this type of ownership structure 
[28], [29]. For instance, firms with large government 
ownership are associated with budget restrictions, absence of 
innovation, reduced financial performance, and high corruption 
[30], [31]. In addition, Jen (2007) [32] refers to other problems 
such as the lack of transparency and the preference of political 
interests at the expense of economic and strategic benefits in 
firms with high government ownership. Prior literature shows 
that these problems translate into poor performance of firms 
with high government ownership [33]-[36]. Hart, Schleifer and 
Vishny (1997) [37] show that firms owned by the government 
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are more interested in low prices for outputs and higher 
employment than in profitability. In another related study, Bai, 
Liu, Lu Song and Zhang (2004) [38] find that when the 
government ownership is dominant, market valuation is 
considerably lower. They infer that state intervention lead to 
bad performance. We argue that bad performance of firms with 
government ownership translates into low dividend payout 
ratios. 
H4: Firms with government as the largest shareholder have 
low dividend payout ratios 
Family ownership is an important characteristic of firms in 
emerging markets. Zhang (1998) [39] suggests that family 
shareholders, particularly when they are also managers, impose 
significant costs to firm because they may undertake sub-
optimal investments due to their lack of diversification. They 
may hire unskilled family members to managerial positions 
rather than appointing experienced and qualified executives 
[40]). When the largest shareholder in a firm is represented by 
a family, the rights of other shareholders may be abused 
resulting in poor transparency and absence of accountability 
[41]. We argue that high agency problems in family controlled 
firms result in low dividend payout ratios. 
H5: Firms with family as the largest shareholder have low 
dividend payout ratios 
Foreign ownership is supposed to positively affect 
corporate culture and its performance. We argue that having 
foreigner as the largest shareholder of a firm is a signal that a 
firm has better governance environment. Our conjecture is 
based on our assumption that foreigners are trained in 
appreciating effective corporate governance. Consistent with 
our arguments, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) [42] report that firms 
with large proportion of foreign ownership have higher 
disclosure levels than other firms. In another related study, 
Khanna and Palepu (1999) [43]  show that foreign investors 
offer monitoring in emerging markets. This strand of literature 
argues that firms with considerable foreign ownership are able 
to attract additional local and foreign investors. Their presence, 
therefore, adds value to the firm. Bai, Lui, Lu, Song and Zhang 
(2004) [38] document high market value for firms with 
considerable foreign ownership. In this paper, we argue that 
lower agency problems and better performance of firms with 
high foreign ownership translates into high dividend payout 
ratios. 
H6: Firms with foreigner as the largest shareholder have 
high dividend payout ratio 
III. DATA 
This paper examines the relationship between ownership 
structure and dividend polices adopted by firms listed at the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange during the period between 2004 
and 2010. The Casablanca Stock Exchange implemented 
considerable governance reforms during the past few years. 
These reforms resulted in arousing considerable interest from 
investors and enabled the Exchange to more than quadruple 
during the recent years. Following sub-sections will explain the 
data in more detail. 
A. Ownership structure 
This paper examines two aspects of ownership structure. 
The first aspect is the ownership concentration and is measured 
by Herfindahl index (CONCENTRATION). This index is 
defined as the sum of the squares of the share of each owner 
and is between 0 and 1. The higher the Herfindahl index, the 
higher is the degree of ownership concentration. Concentration 
of ownership leads to poor information disclosure and higher 
agency problems [44]). The second aspect of ownership 
structure is measured via number of dummy variables that 
differentiate largest shareholders according to their identities. 
For the purpose of this paper, we divide largest shareholders 
into five different groups – institutional investor, industrial 
company, government, family, and foreigner. The institutional 
investor (INST) is defined by a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the largest shareholder is an institutional investor 
and 0 otherwise. We define institutional investors as banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds. The 
industrial company (IND) is defined by a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is an industrial 
company and 0 otherwise. The government (GOV) is defined 
by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the largest 
shareholder is a state and 0 otherwise. The family (FAM) is 
defined by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
largest shareholder is a family and 0 otherwise. To identify 
families, the surnames are used. The foreigner (FOR) is 
defined by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
largest shareholder is a foreigner and 0 otherwise. All of these 
groups of investors can affect corporate governance of a firm to 
varying degrees. Table I documents descriptive statistics for 
ownership concentration for our sample firms during the period 
2004-2010 (Panel A) and across different industries (Panel B). 
The level of ownership concentration represents on average 35 
percent of the structure of the firms in the sample for the 
different industries analyzed. The maximum level reaches 95 
percent. As for the ownership of the largest shareholder, it is 
shown that 67 percent of the ownership is hold by industrial 
companies during the sampling period while 6 percent of all 
firms have the government as the largest shareholder.  
 
Table I: Descriptive statistics for ownership structure variables. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for ownership concentration for the sample firms during the period 2004-
2010. 
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B. Dividend policy 
We define dividend policy by the payout ratio (PoR) which 
is the percentage of earnings paid out as dividends. Dividend 
payouts are supposed to alleviate agency conflicts through the 
reduction of free cash flow available to managers. Data for 
payout ratio was obtained from Worldscope. Table II 
documents descriptive statistics for payout ratios for our 
sample firms during the period 2004-2010. The level of 
distributed dividends represents on average 41 percent for the 
firms in the sample for the different industries analyzed. The 
maximum level reaches 100 percent. 
 
Table II: Descriptive statistics for payout ratios for sample firms during the period 
2004-2010. 
 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
PoR 441 40.6539 31.8709 0 100 
 
 
C. Control variables 
This paper uses a number of firm-specific characteristics, 
such as market value (SIZE), total debt to total asset ratio 
(LEV), and earnings per share (EPS) as control variables. We 
obtain the data for the above mentioned variables from 
Worldscope and Thomson Financials. Table III, Panel A, 
documents descriptive statistics for control variables used in 
the analysis. The average size of the firms in the sample is 11 
million dirhams. As for leverage almost 18 percent of the firms 
are on average relying on debt in their capital structure. The 
results in Table III, Panel B, show no severe multicollinearity 
between our control variables. Therefore, we can include all of 
the control variables together in our regression equations.  
 
Table III: Descriptive statistics for control variables and correlation matrix of the 
independent variables. The sampling period is 2004-2010.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for control variables. 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Size 396 11.22317 3.878569 3.744267 19.53919 
Leverage 201 .1792428 .1877073 0 .877788 
Earnings 398 44.60566 49.74834 -48.12778 232.26 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix of the independent variables. 
 Size 
Size 1.0000 Leverage 
Leverage 0.1539 1.000 Earnings 
Earnings -.0641 -0.0328 1.0000 instd 
instd 0.3468 0.1027 -0.0509 1.0000 famd 
famd -.1873 -0.0041 -0.1783 -.1552 1.0000 govd 
govd 0.2142 0.0068 -0.0748 0.3796 -.0901 1.0000 fored 
fored 0.1139 -0.0955 -0.0694 0.1112 -.0901 -.0524 1.0000 corpindd
corpindd -0.438 -0.0934 0.2049 -.5216 -.5216 -.3030 0.0301 1.0000 herfindhal




In this section, we document the effect of ownership 
structure on dividend policy adopted by firms. More 
specifically, we will look at how different aspects of corporate 
ownership (that is ownership concentration and identity of the 
largest shareholder) relate to dividend policy. A panel data 
analysis is performed in this study and the Hausman test (1978) 
[45] is performed to find out whether to use fixed effects or 
random effects while estimating panel data. The Hausman test 
fundamentally tests the null hypothesis that the individual 
effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables. The 
fixed effects model is used if the null hypothesis is rejected 
since in this case biased estimators will be generated by a 
random effect model. 
A. Ownership concentration and dividend policy 
Our hypothesis suggests that in concentrated ownership 
environment, such as Morocco, ownership structure should be 
the key determinant of dividend policy adopted by firms. In 
order to test our hypothesis, we estimate a regression with 
dividend policy (PoR) as a dependent variable and a variable 
representing ownership concentration (CONCENTRATION) 
as an independent variable. Given the importance of firm-
specific characteristics in determining dividend policy, we add 
a number of control variables in our regression equation. 
Consistent with prior literature, we add size (SIZE), leverage 
(LEV), and earnings per share (EPS) as control variables in our 
analysis. We also include industry dummies (IDUM) and year 
dummies (YDUM) in our regression equation. Our regression 
equation takes the following form. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )









                                                                                                  (1) 
The results of the above analysis are reported in Table IV. 
Results show that neither the concentration ownership nor the 
added controlling variables (size, leverage and earnings) can 
explain the level of distributed dividend for firms listed at the 
Casablanca Stock Exchange.   
 









Number of observations: 200 
F-Value: 3.26 








B. Ownership identity and dividend policy 
We argued that differences in identities of the largest 
shareholder can result in differences in dividend policy adopted 
by firms. In order to test our hypothesis, we estimate a 
regression with dividend policy (PoR) as a dependent variable 
and five dummy variables representing ownership identity 
(FOR, FAM, GOV, INST, IND) as independent variables. As 
was done before, we add size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), earnings 
per share (EPS), industry dummies (IDUM) and year dummies 
(YDUM) as control variables in our analysis. Our regression 
equation takes the following form. 
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The results of the above analysis are reported in Table V. 
Our findings show that two forms of ownership identity 
influence negatively the dividend policy of firms listed at the 
Casablanca stock exchange for the period 2004 – 2010. In fact, 
when the identity of the largest shareholder is either an 
industrial company or a family, the level of distributed 
dividends is decreased. Industrial company ownership leads to 
additional monitoring of managerial discretion [26]. In the 
Moroccan context this may justify the low level of dividends 
distributed in companies where other firms are among the 
largest shareholders. As for family ownership, a typical aspect 
of firms in an emerging market such as Morocco, the low 
dividend payout ratios are justified by high agency problems in 
family controlled firms. Family shareholders increase costs for 
firms because of their lack of diversification [39], the hiring of 
unskilled family members [40], and the abuse of other 
shareholders’ rights [41]. All this may result in poor 
transparency and absence of accountability. 
 













Number of observations: 200 
F-Value: 3.29 













V.  ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS 
In this section, we introduce both set of ownership variables 
together in a single equation.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )











                                                                                                 
(3) 
The results of the above analysis are reported in Table VI. 
Results confirm that firms whose largest shareholder is either 
an industrial company or a family tend to distribute lower 
levels of dividends. Findings also report an insignificant 
coefficient for concentration and for the controlling variables 
size, leverage and earnings per share. Findings appear 
consistent with Zhang, 1998 [39]; Perez-Gonzales, 2006 [40] 
and La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny, 2000 
[41]  who document that family ownership is characterized by 
high agency problems and low dividend payout ratios.  
 
Table VI: Relationship between ownership structure (concentration and identity) and 














Number of observations: 200 
F-Value: 3.26 














This study examines the impact of ownership structure on 
dividend policies of firms listed at the Casablanca Stock 
Exchange during the period between 2004 and 2010. Our 
results show that industrial company ownership and family 
ownership are the two most important determinants of dividend 
policies. Consistent with our expectations, we show that family 
firms distribute lower percentage of earnings as dividends. 
Unexpectedly, we also show that firms with industrial 
company ownership also distribute low dividends. 
Furthermore, we show no impact of ownership concentration 
on dividend policies for firms listed at the Casablanca Stock 
Exchange. 
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